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Terrorism and National Security Intelligence Laws

TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE LAWS:
ASSESSING AUSTRALIAN REFORMS
Gregory Rose∗ and Diana Nestorovska#
The Australian legal definition of terrorism and a brief history of terrorism in Australia
set the context for national security intelligence laws. Recent national reforms are
surveyed and critically examined here. It is concluded that they do not duplicate other
powers and are subject to respectable, although not impeccable, safeguards. Some
provisions need to be clarified to delimit their scope and others could be hampered in
operation by the uncertainty of constitutionally implied limits.

1

INTRODUCTION

A wide array of law reforms to strengthen Australian counter-terrorism
capabilities were introduced at Commonwealth level in 2002 and are being
supplemented continuously. These capabilities and their respective enabling
laws can be divided into two categories: (a) those concerned with the
proscription of terrorism, and which are located within the substantive criminal
laws concerning law enforcement and punishment after the commission of
terrorist crimes; and (b) national security laws, which gear a range of relevant
public management sectors towards the prevention of terrorist crimes. National
security1 enabling laws can be sub-grouped into those concerning pro-active
threat mitigation by means of intelligence networks, border controls and
financial flow monitoring, and those that address responses after a terrorist
incident by means of crisis management.2
The security intelligence gathering aspects of the recent Australian reforms were
politically controversial and much has been written attacking them as threats to
∗
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Associate Professor, Director of Research, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention,
Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
Researcher, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, Faculty of Law, University of
Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (‘ASIO Act’) s 4 defines
‘security’ as ‘(a) the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several
States and Territories from: (i) espionage; (ii) sabotage; (iii) politically motivated violence;
(iv) promotion of communal violence; (v) attacks on Australia’s defence system; or (vi)
acts of foreign interference; whether directed from, or committed within Australia or not;
and (b) the carrying out of Australia's responsibilities to any foreign country in relation to a
matter mentioned in any of the subparagraphs of paragraph (a).’ The term ‘politically
motivated violence’ has been defined to include ‘terrorism offences’ (s 4). Thus, laws on
intelligence networks, border and financial controls which serve, inter alia, the purpose of
detecting and preventing any of these defined activities, and specifically, terrorism, can be
regarded as national security laws.
The framework for this analysis of national security laws is adapted from Nathan Hancock,
‘Terrorism and Law in Australia: Legislation, Commentary and Constraints’, Department
of the Parliamentary Library, Information and Research Services, Research Paper No 12
2001-02, 9-22.
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Australian civil liberties.3 Liberal democracies such as Australia eschew
unnecessary constraints on freedom.4 However, the legal powers necessary for a
democratic society's security intelligence agencies are a matter that can only be
properly determined through its representative democratic processes.5 In
Australia, Parliaments form the central machinery for those processes and
federal parliamentary consideration of the security intelligence powers
introduced by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment
(Terrorism) Act 2003 (‘ASIO Terrorism Act’) has certainly been ‘robust’.6 Its
deliberations were enriched by an opposition dominated Upper House.
Extensive contributions were provided by independent specialists and from civil
society through submissions to parliamentary committees.7
The tendency of Australian jurists has been to critique the new counter-terrorism
legislation for imposing unnecessary constraints by applying a rights-based
approach, using international law human rights standards. Williams, for
example, suggests that counter-terrorism legislation ‘can be justified where it is
proportionate to the threat faced and where any diminution of the rule of law or
human rights principles is no more than is “strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation”.’8
However, whether constraints on liberty are necessary (in the public policy
sense of that term) is a question that can be approached using legal theoretical
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See, eg, the special issues of the University of New South Wales Law Journal (2004) 27(2);
and also articles by Michael Head, ‘Counter-Terrorism Laws: A Threat to Political
Freedom, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law
Review 666; Michael Head, ‘Counter-Terrorism Laws Threaten Fundamental Democratic
Rights’ (2002) 27(3) Alternative Law Journal 121; and George Williams, ‘One year on:
Australia’s legal response to September 11’ (2002) 27(5) Alternative Law Journal 212, to
name but a few.
The classic liberal philosopher is John Stuart Mill: ‘There is a limit to the legitimate
interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and
maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs,
as protection against political despotism.’ See: John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in John M
Robson (ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (1977) 220.
The issue of whether such powers can be given is discussed in n 116 below.
To use Hocking’s term in Jenny Hocking, ‘National Security and Democratic Rights:
Australian Terror Laws’ (2004) 16(1) The Sydney Papers 92. See also discussion in
‘Parliamentary and Judicial Review’ below p151.
See, eg, Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia,
An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) and Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee,
Parliament of Australia, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters (2002).
George Williams, ‘National Security, Terrorism and Bills of Rights’ (2003) 8(2) Australian
Journal of Human Rights 269. This approach seems to draw inspiration from Dworkin’s
work on the ‘best theory’ of political morality: see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously (1977).
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frameworks9 other than a rights-based framework; and rights-based frameworks
themselves are contestable.10 Mooted juridical approaches contribute value to
the public policy debate but cannot predetermine its outcome.
It is the not the authors' intention here to debate the meanings of liberty and
security, to evaluate public policy choices or even to defend the national
security intelligence reforms. This article seeks, as far as is possible, to examine
the reforms from less value-laden perspectives. Thus, it studies them with a
technical legal eye, analysing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
reforms in terms of whether they are duplicative and obscure, or utile and clear.
First, the definition of terrorism that is utilised in Australian legislation is
considered and then Australia’s experience with terrorism is summarised. The
substantive criminal laws have been assessed in detail elsewhere and are merely
noted here to set the legal context. The new national security intelligence laws
are then examined and tested for clarity and for necessity, as defined below.
The conclusion drawn is that the national security intelligence law reforms are
utile but that some provisions need to be clarified to define their scope and
improve their workability.
2

ESTABLISHING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1

Terrorism

The controversy that usually surrounds counter-terrorism laws largely concerns
the conceptual definition of their core subject matter: terrorism. There is as yet

9

10

For example, a utilitarian framework might be adopted. (‘An action may be said to be
conformable to the principle of utility … when the tendency it has to augment the
happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.’: Jeremy Bentham, ‘An
introduction to the principles of morals and legislation’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of
Jeremy Bentham (1943) vol I, 1).
Controversy as to the content of rights is familiar. For example, Williams adds that
constraints on liberty in counter-terrorism legislation should be temporary and limited by a
sunset clause (Williams, above n 8). The suggestion reflects Article 4 of the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 (‘ICCPR’), 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force
23 March 1976) and Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950
(‘ECHR’), 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). The conventions
distinguish between core and non-core obligations and permit parties to derogate from their
non-core obligations in times of public emergency. Neither permits derogation at any time
from certain core obligations (see ICCPR, Articles 6-8, 11, 15-16 and 18 and ECHR,
Articles 2, 3, 4 and 7). Yet there are also other formulations of human rights principles.
For example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act 1982,
being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, s 1 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 (NZ), s 5 do not distinguish between core and non-core rights and provide that
rights are subject to any ‘reasonable limits’ prescribed by law. In this way, Canadian and
New Zealand laws can limit prescribed rights in ongoing circumstances that are not
restricted to public emergencies. Which is the better articulation for Australian public
morality?
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no general definition of terrorism agreed under the laws of the United Nations,11
although it is apparent that one is finally emerging, as we have demonstrated
elsewhere.12 A definition in Australian law is necessary to provide a clear
reference for the triggering of the various law enforcement, security
intelligence, incident prevention and emergency powers concerned. Therefore,
rather than the emerging international legal definition, the focus here is on the
established Australian definition. That definition is set out below.13
In Australia, the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth)
amended the federal Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), to define a terrorist act and
make it an offence.14 It is composed of two basic components: serious acts of
violence and the context of political conflict. For example, a serious violent
crime such as kidnapping becomes a terrorist act if committed with the intent to
exert pressure for gains in a political conflict. In the amended Criminal Code,
‘terrorist act’ means any action or threat of action that falls into subsection (2)
of section 100.1, but does not fall under subsection (3). An act falls within
subsection (2) if the action or the threat of action would cause death or serious
physical harm to a person or serious damage to property, endanger another
person’s life, create a serious health or safety risk to the public or seriously
interfere with, disrupt or destroy an electronic system. The political context is
set by requiring that the act also must be done with the intention of advancing a
political, religious or ideological cause as well as with the intention of coercing
or intimidating the Government of the Commonwealth or a State, or
intimidating sections of the public. Subsection (3) includes a safeguard for civil
liberties. It expressly excludes advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action
from the operation of the Act, so long as such action is not intended to cause
serious harm or death to a person, endanger another person’s life or create a
serious health or safety risk to the public.15
The substantive new criminal laws relating to terrorism were set out in
amendments to the Criminal Code. They include offences which relate to: acts
preparatory to terrorism;16 murder or injury of Australians overseas;17 using
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See Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’ in Rosalyn Higgins
and Maurice Flory (eds), Terrorism and International Law (1997) 14-19.
See Gregory Rose and Diana Nestorovska, ‘Towards an ASEAN Counter-Terrorism
Treaty’ (2005) 9 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 157, 158-166.
The authors’ contribution to analysis of the Australian definition is forthcoming in a
companion article: ‘Terrorism and Criminal Law - Assessing Australian Reforms’.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 101.1. The Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW),
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 2003 (NT), Police Powers and Responsibilities Act
2000 (Qld), Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) and Terrorism (Community
Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) all adopt the Commonwealth definition of terrorist act.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 101.1(3).
Sections 101.2, 101.3, 101.4, 101.5 and 101.6, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995
(Cth) by the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) Schedule 1.
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postal services to make threats, hoaxes or send dangerous articles;18 and
misusing telecommunications systems to make threats.19 A legal mechanism
was adopted within the Criminal Code to blacklist terrorist organisations and to
criminalise directing, recruiting, funding, training, supporting or associating
with terrorist organisations.20 In addition, terrorist bombing and financing
activities were criminalised in accordance with recently ratified international
Other amendments concerning participation in foreign
conventions.21
incursions, in espionage;22 treason;23 and treachery24 were adopted harmonising
definitions of those crimes with the new terrorist crimes.
2.2

Security Intelligence

National security law reforms complement the substantive criminal laws.
Whereas criminal laws are typically administered by the police, prosecutors and
courts, national security laws are administered by a more fragmented array of
governmental agencies in fields such as intelligence gathering, border control,
transport, industry, civil defence and foreign affairs. National security laws
support activities in all these fields, although those analysed here concern only
security intelligence. Security intelligence is taken here to mean data
assembled, sometimes covertly, and analysed by government agencies to deliver
information about intended terrorist acts in advance of their commission.25 In
17
18

19

20
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22
23
24
25

Division 104, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code
Amendment (Offences Against Australians) Act 2002 Schedule 1.
Sections 471.10 and 471.14, inserted into Part 10.5 (Postal Offences) of the Criminal Code
Act 1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act
2002 Schedule 1; and ss 471.11, 471.12, 471.13 and 471.15, inserted into Part 10.5 (Postal
Offences) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code Amendment (AntiHoax and Other Measures) Act 2002 Schedule 2.
Sections 474.14, 474.15 and 474.16, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) (No
2) Act 2004 Schedule 1.
Division 102, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Security Legislation
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) Schedule 1, and variously amended by the AntiTerrorism Act (No 2) 2004, Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004,
Anti-Terrorism Act 2003, Criminal Code Amendment (Hizballah) Act 2003 and Criminal
Code Amendment (HAMAS and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Act 2003.
These are the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened
for signature 15 December 1997, [2002] ATS 17 (entered into force 23 May 2001) and the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for
signature 9 December 1999, [2002] ATS 23 (entered into force 1 April 2002). The
international obligations under these conventions were inserted into the Criminal Code Act
1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act
2002 and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002.
Section 91.1, inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Criminal Code
Amendment (Espionage and Related Matters) Act 2002 Schedule 1.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 80.1.
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 24AA.
The term ‘security’ for the purposes of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
Act 1979 (Cth) was defined above in n 1.
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contrast, again, criminal investigations are usually conducted by police and
related law enforcement agencies to gather information concerning terrorist acts
after the proscribed acts have been committed or during their preparation.
2.3

Analytical Method

The new national security intelligence laws are critically examined here to
evaluate whether they conform to criteria for necessity and clarity, as set out
below. This is undertaken as an essentially technical exercise. It does not
pretend to investigate the deeper policy questions concerning whether the new
counter-terrorism measures are necessary for national security.
To assess the necessity of the newly adopted provisions, this paper compares the
new provisions to others already present within the broader framework of
Commonwealth law. The humble purpose of this connection is to assess
whether the new laws are duplicative, or overlap substantially and inconsistently
with existing laws. To assess their clarity, analysis is undertaken of whether
they are specific, certain, readily understood and practicable. Where the new
provisions are found lacking in either respect, suggestions are offered for their
improvement.
The constitutionality of the national security law amendments has a bearing
upon whether they are certain and workable. Their support by a constitutional
head of power has been addressed elsewhere and is not discussed here.26
However, whether the amendments contravene express and implied rights
within the Constitution is explored. Much of the controversy surrounding the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ‘ASIO Act’ might
stem from the fact that Australia, unlike some other Western nations, does not
have a constitutional Bill of Rights against which to judge the ASIO Act
provisions.27 Instead, the ASIO Act has been assessed during its various stages
against the provisions of international human rights instruments, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).28 Nevertheless,

26

27
28

Carne considers the Constitutional heads of power which could support the ASIO
amendments: Greg Carne, ‘Detaining Questions or Compromising Constitutionality? The
ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth)’ (2004) 27(2) University of New
South Wales Law Journal 524, 528. From 531 he discusses the following powers: defence;
external affairs; executive power, express incidental power; and ‘the implied power to
protect the polity’.
Williams, above n 8, 269. See also George Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of
Rights: Freedom in the War on Terror 2004.
For example, see Christopher Michaelsen, ‘International Human Rights on Trial – The
United Kingdom’s and Australia’s Legal Response to 9/11’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review
275. Relevant provisions in the ICCPR include those against arbitrary arrest or detention
(art 9), protection from self-incrimination (art 14(3)(g)), the presumption of innocence (art
14(2)) and the treatment of detainees (arts 7 and 10). Ultimately, if the ASIO amendments
are inconsistent with the ICCPR, the international legal issue is whether the derogations can
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the suggestion that the ICCPR provides guidance in Australian constitutional
interpretation is dubious.29 More pertinent to Australian legal interpretation are
the express and implied rights within the Australian Constitution, as recognised
in the jurisprudence of the Australian High Court.
3

TERRORISM: THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE

Unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia has had relatively
limited experience with terrorism on its own soil, the Hilton bombing having the
highest profile. On 13 February 1978, a bomb exploded outside the Hilton
Hotel in Sydney, where the first Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
(‘CHOGM’) was scheduled to take place later that day. It killed three people
and injured several others. The Prime Minister at the time, Malcolm Fraser,
took an unprecedented decision to call out the armed forces to protect the
leaders for the remainder of CHOGM. This was the first time since 1901 that
the Commonwealth Government deployed military personnel to maintain order
against a domestic threat during peacetime.30
Although the Hilton bombing was the only attack on Australian soil that posed a
sufficient threat to national security for the Government to take military action,
it was not Australia’s only encounter with terrorism. One year prior to the
Hilton bombing, the Indian High Commissioner was wounded when he and his
wife were kidnapped at gunpoint.31 In 1972, a Yugoslav Travel Agency was
bombed in Sydney, injuring 16 people.32 In 1980, a group known as the Justice
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide assassinated the Turkish ConsulGeneral and his bodyguard.33 There was a subsequent attack against Turkish
interests in Australia in 1986, when the Turkish Consulate-General was
bombed.34 Israeli-related interests have also been the subjects of violent attacks:
in 1982, two bombs were detonated in the building of the Israeli ConsulateGeneral and the Jewish Hakoah Club.35
Most of these acts of violence were aimed at institutions with an international
context. In the early 1980s, however, several acts of violence were directed

29

30
31
32
33
34
35

be justified under Article 4 of the said convention, which permits them temporarily in times
of public emergency.
Hilary Charlesworth et al, ‘Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Order’
(2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 424. In Al-Kateb v Godwin (2002) 208 ALR 124, McHugh J
described the suggestion as ‘heretical’: 140.
Tom Molomby, Spies, Bombs & the Path of Bliss (2000) 9.
Jenny Hocking, Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy
(2004) 131.
Ibid 125.
Significant Events in ASIO’s History Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
<http://www.asio.gov.au/About/Timeline/Content/main.htm> at 5 May 2005.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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against an Australian institution: the Family Court. These included the shooting
of one judge in 1980 and the death of another judge’s wife in an explosion in
1984. Despite repeated targeting of the Family Court, there was consensus that
the culprit was a disgruntled father seeking revenge over a decision that went
against him, rather than a tactic in political conflict.36 For some writers,
however, the nature of the violence was clear: ‘When an attack upon an
individual or institution is understood to be the expression of a demand on the
community, such violence is terrorism.’37
The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (‘ASIO’) has also noted
incidents of politically motivated violence in Australia during the 1990s, all of
which had terrorist overtones.38 For example, in 1992, the Iranian Embassy in
Canberra was vandalised and its staff assaulted by Mujahideen e-Khalq
supporters. In 1995, following France’s decision to resume nuclear testing in
the Pacific, protesters set the honorary French Consulate in Perth on fire. In
1999, protesters from the pro-Kurdistan Workers Party occupied the Greek
Consulate-General in Sydney following the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah
Ocalan.
In the aftermath of the Hilton bombing, the former London Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, was commissioned to advise the
Commonwealth on policing resources and protective security.39 Amongst other
things, Sir Robert recommended the creation of an anti-terrorist squad within
the Australian Police Force as well as the amalgamation of the Commonwealth
and Australian Capital Territory Police Forces.40 At the same time, Justice
Hope was commissioned to review protective security powers and
arrangements.41 He concluded that intelligence gathering and law enforcement
authorities had adequate powers under existing legislation.42 Irregularities in
the conviction for murder in 1990 of a man said to be the ‘mastermind’ behind
the Hilton bombing led to his pardon two years later amid suspicions of the
culpability of the New South Wales Police ‘Special Branch’ for the blast.43
36
37
38
39

40
41
42
43

Tracey Taylor, ‘Australian terrorism: Traditions of Violence and the Family Court
Bombings’ (1992) 8 Australian Journal of Law and Society 15.
Ibid 15-16.
Significant Events in ASIO’s History, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
<http://www.asio.gov.au/About/Timeline/Content/main.htm> at 5 May 2005.
Nathan Hancock, ‘Terrorism and the Law in Australia: Supporting Material’, Department
of the Parliamentary Library, Information and Research Services, Research Paper No 13
2001-02, 28.
Ibid. The latter recommendation was implemented by the Australian Federal Police Force
Act 1979.
Above n 39, 28-29.
Ibid 29.
The NSW Police Special Branch was responsible for criminal intelligence gathering. It has
been alleged that, in collusion with ASIO, it sought to stage a bombing to demonstrate that
secret intelligence services served an imperative security need at a time when their powers
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Concerns over their conduct in the matter generated fierce suspicion and
antagonism towards intelligence agencies that still endures in some circles.44
That was over 20 years ago, before terrorism matured into its ‘modern’ phase.45
Australia was unprepared for the slaughter on 12 October 2002 of 88 of its
nationals by the Islamic Jihad bombing in the Sari Club in Kuta, Bali.46 One
hundred Australians were murdered in terrorist acts during the first four years of
the new millennium and at least one attack in Australia, or against Australian
interests overseas, occurred or was disrupted or aborted, in each year.47 In
2005, ASIO estimated that up to 80 people in Australia have trained or have
close links with terrorist groups, but that only 10% of them could be charged
with offences occurring after the entry into force of new counter-terror criminal
laws.48 Five are currently facing charges.49
4

ASIO’S SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ROLE

The Australian security intelligence community includes information collection
and information analysis organisations.
ASIO, the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service (‘ASIS’) and the Defence Signals Directorate (‘DSD’)

44
45
46

47

48
49

were under serious political attack. Three members of Ananda Marga, a religious
revolutionary sect, were convicted in a related matter in 1979 but pardoned in 1985. The
three included Tim Anderson, the alleged ‘mastermind’ later pardoned again. It is still
unknown who was responsible for the blast. See generally Molomby, above n 30; Head
(MULR), above n 3, 670 and E Magner, ‘Is a Terrorist entitled to the Protection of the Law
of Evidence?’ (1988) 11(3) Sydney Law Review 537, 567.
Head, above n 3.
The term ‘modern terrorism’ and its international dimension is discussed in Patrick Brogan,
World Conflicts (3rd ed, 1998) 555.
There was one Australian killed in the terrorist attack on the Sbarro Restaurant in Jerusalem
on 9 August 2001, 10 in the World Trade Centre attacks on 11 September 2001, 88 in the
Bali attacks on 12 October 2002, one in the Jakarta Marriott bombing on 5 August 2003
and one in the London bombing on 7 July 2005. On Australia’s unpreparedness for the
Bali attacks and the response of law enforcement agencies, see Mick Keelty, ‘The new
landscape of law enforcement’ (2003) 80 Platypus Magazine 14-15; Tom Allard, ‘Two
nations caught tragically unprepared: Terrorism strikes home’, Sydney Morning Herald
(Sydney), 14 October 2002, 6; Michael Carlton, ‘Unaware, unready for a foreign world’s
rage’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 October 2002, 50.
On the number of potential attacks on Australia that have been disrupted, see comments by
Denis Richardson, Director-General’s Address, LAWASIA Conference 2005, Gold Coast,
Wednesday 23 March 2005, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation,
<http://www.asio.gov.au/Media/Contents/lawasia_conference.htm> at 5 August 2005. The
Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Mick Keelty, has also recently backed the claim
of a former ASIO agent that there are about 60 suspected Islamic extremists in Australia:
‘Keelty backs agent: extremists are here’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 3 August
2005. On the number of Australians killed since 2000, see above n 46.
Patrick Walters and Greg Roberts, ‘Dozens’ of Aussies with terror links’, The Australian
(Sydney), 24 March 2005.
Ibid.
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collect information.50 The Office of National Assessments (‘ONA’), Defence
Intelligence Organisation (‘DIO’) and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial
Organisation (‘DIGO’) analyse data collected by ASIO, ASIS and DSD.51 The
Australian Crime Commission (‘ACC’) is unusual for its hybrid intelligence
gathering and law enforcement characteristics but its purposes are more closely
related to crime prevention than security protection.52
Under the National Counter-Terrorism Policy (‘NCTP’), ASIO is made
responsible for the gathering of intelligence about terrorist threats to Australia.53
ASIO also advises the Government regarding security threats through threat
assessments of specific events, facilities, sectors or individuals.54 ASIO’s
purpose, powers and functions are outlined under the ASIO Act.55 Prior to 2003,
ASIO already had powers to enter and search premises, conduct personal
searches, access computers, attach listening and tracking devices and intercept
telephones and mail.56 These powers continue and, in issuing search warrants,
the Minister must be satisfied that

50

51
52

53

54
55

56

Noted in Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02,
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill
2002 Australian Parliamentary Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/200102/02bd128.htm> at 19 May 2004. For a discussion on the history of Australian
intelligence agencies, see Frank Cain, ‘Australian Intelligence Organisations and the Law:
A Brief History’ (2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 296, 317. Cain
traces the development of Australian intelligence agencies from World War I and argues
that through its expansion of powers to fight the ‘war on terror’, ASIO has effectively
become a secret police force, which selectively provides the Government with intelligence
that favours its political aims.
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02, Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002.
Its main purpose is to ‘enhance Australian law enforcement’s capacity to counter serious
and organised criminal activity’ through the provision of intelligence, collaborative
partnerships and information sharing. See Australian Crime Commission Website
<http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/content/about/acc-profile.pdf> at 3 August 2005.
National Cournter-Terrorism Committee, National Counter-Terrorism Plan (‘NCTP’)
(2003) Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/NationalSecurityHome.nsf/Page/RWPCD8501294925D
A06CA256D42001C1A4C?OpenDocument > at 30 November 2004. More information on
the NTCP appears under ‘Prevention’, 3:1.
Ibid items 14 and 18.
The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (‘ASIS’), though it existed under an executive
order from 1952, was given a statutory framework under the Intelligence Services Act 2001.
See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 11 2001-2002,
Intelligence Services Amendment Bill 2001, Australian Parliamentary Website,
<http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb//view_document.aspx?TABLE=BILLSDGS&ID=46
37 > at 30 November 2004.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 25(4), 25(4A)(a),
25A(1), 26(1)(c), 26A(2) and 27; Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth) Pt III
and Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02,
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill
2002.
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‘there are reasonable grounds for believing that access by [ASIO] to records or
other things on particular premises (the subject premises) will substantially assist
the collection of intelligence in accordance with this Act in respect of a matter
(the security matter) that is important in relation to security.’57

However, because intelligence gathering from other than open sources is often
achieved through covert operations, ASIO never had the power to interview
suspected persons, which was left to the law enforcement agencies.58
In 2003, ASIO’s powers were enhanced by the ASIO Terrorism Act, which
added Division III to Part III of the original Act. The definition of politically
motivated violence in the ASIO Act was expanded to include terrorism
offences.59 Further, ASIO was given the power to detain and question terrorist
suspects, and non-suspects, who may have information on terrorist activities.60
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill
2002 (‘ASIO Terrorism Bill’) was first introduced into the House of
Representatives on 21 March 2002. It was controversial and the Bill's passage
attracted enormous scrutiny during months of federal parliamentary
wrangling.61 One commentator described the original Bill as ‘a law that would
57

58
59

60
61

Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 25(2). The tests for
other warrants are couched in similar terms: computer access warrants (s 25A); listening
devices warrants (s 26(3)); tracking device warrants (s 26B(2)); postal interception warrants
(s 27(2)) and delivery service interception warrants (s 27AA(2)). There are also special
warrants to obtain foreign intelligence within Australia: see ss 17(1)(e), 27A and 27B.
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02, Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), s 4. Similarly, the
Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002 (Cth) amended the
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1979 (Cth) to include terrorist acts in
the class of serious offences for which interception warrants may be issued. The
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) broadens the definition of
‘class 1 offence’ to include the terrorist offences listed in the Commonwealth Criminal
Code Act 1995, ss 72, 101, 102 and 103: s 5(1)(cb). It also permits the recording of
communications to ASIO public lines without the need for a warrant: see s 6(3) and
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 111 2003-04,
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill 2004, Australian Parliamentary
Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd111.htm> at 12 February
2005. The Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment (Stored Communications) Act
2004 excludes ‘stored communications’, such as filed email, from the scope of the
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1979 (Cth) for a period of 12 months
pending inquiries into the feasibility of a new regulatory regime for such communications:
see Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 37, 2004-05,
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment (Stored Communications) Act 2004
Australian
Parliamentary
Website
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/200405/05bd037.htm> at 12 February 2005.
See below, ‘Warrants to detain’, 11.
For example, see Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, above n 7, and
Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, above n 7. There were 434 submissions
reported in the Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee inquiry into the Australian
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not be out of place in the dictatorships such as General Pinochet’s Chile.’62 It
was passed one year later than other components of the 2002 counter-terrorism
legal reform package. Much of the controversy stemmed from the original
Bill’s provisions relating to powers to detain and search children above the age
of 10 and restricting persons questioned or detained from contacting family
members or lawyers.63
The Bill was finally passed by both Houses with amendments, receiving the
Royal Assent on 22 July 2003.64 Since the passage of the ASIO Terrorism Act,
the ASIO Act has been amended several more times to bolster federal
governmental counter-terrorism powers.65 The most significant expansion of
powers among these amendments was the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (‘ASIO Amendment Act 2004’).
It allows ASIO to undertake security assessments in relation to prescribed
administrative actions. These include actions relating to whether a person
should have access: to national security information; to places where access is
controlled on national security grounds; or regarding a person’s ability to
perform an activity related to a thing.66 The motivating purpose of these
amendments was to enhance ASIO’s ability to carry out security assessments in

62
63

64

65

66

Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/200204/asio_2/report/contents.htm> at 8 November 2005 and 167 submissions reported in the
Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/terrorbill2002/terrorindex.htm> at 8
November 2005).
Williams, above n 3, 215.
Ibid. See also Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02,
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill
2002.
Apart from the debate on whether the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 was necessary, the controversy surrounded the provisions
relating to the detention and search of children above 10 years of age and detention
incommunicado without access to legal representation: see Head (ALJ), above n 3, 121126. The original provisions allow for access to legal advice provided certain criteria are
met and invalidate warrants for children below 16 years of age: see below, ‘Warrants to
Detain’, 11.
The significant amendments are set out in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
Legislation Amendment Act 2003, Anti-Terrorism Act (No 3) 2004 and Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Act 2004. Other minor amendments to
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) were made by
Communication Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2004 (which gives the Australian
Communications Authority the power to refuse a carrier licence on national security
grounds) and Australian Passports (Transnationals and Consequentials) Act 2005 (Cth)
(which makes consequential amendments to the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), replacing references to the old Passports Act 1938 with
references to the new Australian Passports Act 2005).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 35(a), 39(2).
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relation to the importation, use and storage of ammonium nitrate.67 On 24 June
2004, the Council of Australian Government (‘COAG’) agreed that the States
and Territories should introduce a licensing system for ammonium nitrate
products with more than 45% nitrate content.68 This slightly broadened base for
gathering security intelligence on a recently perceived security threat - the
mishandling of ammonium nitrate - is clear and straightforward and it aroused
none of the controversy that surrounded ASIO’s new powers to detain for
questioning as set out in the ASIO Terrorism Act.69 In the following pages,
those detention powers, secrecy provisions concerning detentions and avenues
for administrative and judicial review of detentions are examined and are
analysed for their necessity and clarity.
4.1

Warrants to Detain

The ASIO Terrorism Act introduced powers to detain and question. A person
may be detained for questioning for up to 168 hours (seven days) continuously70
by a prescribed authority (ie an independent legal expert, described below) upon
issue of a warrant by an issuing authority (ie a judicial officer, described below).
Special rules apply for minors between the ages of 16 and 1871 and warrants are
ineffective for children under 16 years of age.72 The Director-General of ASIO
must first seek the Attorney-General’s consent to request the issue of a
warrant.73 The Attorney-General may consent if he or she is satisfied, amongst
other things, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that issuing the
warrant will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in
relation to a terrorism offence.74 An issuing authority may then issue a warrant
to question a person if the Director-General of ASIO has requested such a
67

68

69

70
71
72
73
74

Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 45 2004-05, Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2004, Australian Parliamentary
Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2004-05/05bd045.htm> at 12 February
2005.
Principles for the Regulation of Ammonium Nitrate (2004) Council of Australian
Governments <http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/250604/attachments_d.pdf> at 11
February 2005.
For more information on this amendment, see Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, Bills Digest No 45 2004-05, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
Amendment Bill 2004, Australian Parliamentary Website
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2004-05/05bd045.htm> at 10 August 2005.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HC.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34NA(4)-(7).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NA(1).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34C(1) and 34D.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C(3). The other
things considered are whether relying on other intelligence collecting methods would be
ineffective, that the procedures in sub-s (3A) have been followed and that if the warrant
requires the immediate detention of the person, there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the person may alert another person about the investigation, fail to appear before the
prescribed authority or otherwise destroy any evidence.
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warrant in accordance with the Act75 and the issuing authority is satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant will substantially
assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism
offence.76 Importantly, the detainee need not be a suspect to be the subject of a
warrant.77 Where a person fails to appear before a prescribing authority or fails
to produce any document, object or thing as required once a warrant has been
issued, the person may be prosecuted78 and the onus of proof falls upon
defendants to prove their innocence.79
These powers to detain and question are extraordinarily wide, particularly as
they apply to minors over 16 years old.80 There were no such detention and
questioning powers prior to enactment of the ASIO Terrorism Act. Although the
Crimes Act 1914 was amended in 2002 to include provisions concerning
investigation of arrested terror suspects, including investigative detention
periods, its provisions do not concern information collection from nonsuspects.81 The quality of information sought for security intelligence is
different from criminal evidence, as indicated by the constraint against any
information concerning an accused criminal suspect gathered through the use of
an ASIO questioning warrant being used as evidence in court against that
suspect.82 Thus, detention for information gathering entails different purposes,
different qualities of information and different procedures.
75
76
77
78
79
80

81

82

Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C(4).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34D(1).
The wording of ss 34(3)(c) and 34D(1)(b) only require the Director-General to be satisfied
that the person will assist in the collection of intelligence.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34G(3) and (6).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34G(4) and (7).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NA. Concern over
recruitment of minors into terrorist activities in Australia has centred on support for ‘the
jihad stream’ in the Sydney-based Islamic Youth Movement, see: General Information
About Nida`ul Islam Magazine Nida’ul – The Call of Islam
<http://www.islam.org.au/general/aboutus.htm> at March 2004.
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 23CB, 23DA. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth) amended the
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to increase from eight to 20 hours the maximum fixed investigation
period for terrorism offences and to reasonably suspend or delay investigations to enable
authorities to make inquiries in overseas locations in different time zones. Procedural
safeguards such as the right to remain silent, contact a legal practitioner and the tape
recording of admissions as a precondition to admissibility still apply: ss 23G, 23N and 23S.
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34G(9). Nevertheless, it
might be possible that a court would accept police evidence obtained subsequent to security
intelligence questioning as an indirect result of the information obtained from that process.
See A Palmer, ‘Investigating and Prosecuting Terrorism: The Counter-Terrorism
Legislation and the Law of Evidence’ (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law
Journal 373, 386-7. Palmer argues that s 34G(9) of the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) offers ‘use immunity’ rather than ‘derivative use immunity.’
The latter would allow the use of derivative evidence that is obtained as an indirect result of
the interrogation process. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No
128 2001-02, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 notes that a derivative use immunity was in place for investigations
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Warrant issuing authorities are magistrates and superior court judges appointed
by the Attorney-General (although they can refuse the appointment).83 It has
been argued that vesting judges with the role of issuing authorities is
incompatible with their judicial functions, which are separated from executive
functions under the federal Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.84 In
relation to issuing authorities, it was held in Grollo v Palmer that the executive
role of judges as issuers of interception warrants under the Telecommunications
(Interception) Act 1959 (Cth) was compatible with the exercise of their judicial
functions.85 The majority considered that interception warrants should only be
issued by authorities such as judges because the authorization of intrusions into
privacy requires impartial evaluation.86 A similar argument applies in the case
of ASIO questioning warrants. The pertinent issue is whether a judge’s role as
either an issuing or prescribed authority would prejudice the capacity of the
individual judge, or of the judiciary as an institution, to discharge effectively the
responsibilities of exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth.87 Yet,
the reasoning in the Grollo decision was narrowly divided and the majority of
the High Court seems since to have shifted towards a more restrictive position
on the constitutionality of judicial exercise of Executive powers.88 Thus, it is
nevertheless arguable, in principle, that the role of federal judges as issuing
authorities is unconstitutional and renders the issuing procedure uncertain and
unworkable. However, the precedent of Grollo, which is precisely on point, is
likely to be determinative.
Prescribed authorities, who may detain and question a person who is the subject
of a warrant,89 are to include, in order of preference: retired federal superior
court judges who have served for at least five years,90 current State and Territory
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under the National Crime Authority Act 1984 but that this was removed by the National
Crime Authority Legislation Amendment Act 2001 because ‘the public interest in the
Authority having full and effective investigatory powers, and … the use against the person
of incriminating material derived from the evidence given to the Authority, outweigh the
merits of affording full protection to self-incriminatory material’ (citing the National Crime
Authority Legislation Amendment Bill 2001, Explanatory Memorandum, 8). It can be
analogously argued that the serious nature of terrorism would also outweigh fully
protecting self-incriminatory material.
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34AB(1), 34AB(2).
The doctrine that federal courts may not exercise non-judicial powers was set out in R v
Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271-2 (Dixon CJ,
McTiernan, Fullager and Kitto JJ).
(1995) 184 CLR 348 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ; McHugh J dissenting).
Ibid 367.
Ibid 365.
In Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1,
the High Court considered whether the particular administrative task (in this case
production of an investigative report) was ‘compatible’ with the judicial role otherwise
performed by judges.
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F(1)(a).
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34B(1).
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superior court judges who have served for five years or, failing that, the
President or a Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal who has
been enrolled as a High Court or Supreme Court legal practitioner for at least
five years.91 The appointee must consent.92 To exercise this power, the
prescribed authority must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that, if the person is not detained, he or she may undermine the
investigation.93 This condition imposes a safety check, additional to the
exercise of judgment by the issuing authority. The requirement of approval by
both an issuing authority and a prescribed authority appears sufficient to ensure
that detentions are premised on sound reasons.
The constitutional separation of federal executive and judicial powers underlies
the specification of persons who are not federal judges as prescribed authorities.
Nevertheless, the appointment of State Supreme Court judges could still be
problematic, given that such judges may exercise federal judicial powers.94 In
the Kable Case, the High Court held that New South Wales legislation to permit
the NSW Supreme Court to detain a named person was invalid because it
conferred non-judicial powers on the NSW State Supreme Court.95 The powers
of State Supreme Courts were considered to be part of an integrated judicial
system for the exercise of both State and federal judicial power96 within the
context of Chapter III of the Constitution.97 As the Constitution institutes a
separation between Commonwealth judicial and executive powers, and does not
distinguish between the status of State Courts vested with federal jurisdiction
and the High Court of Australia, it followed that no executive function could be
vested in State Supreme Courts that would ‘be of a nature that might lead an
ordinary reasonable member of the public to conclude that the court was not
independent of the executive government of the State.’98 Consequently,
executive functions vested in State judges are potentially vulnerable to the same
tests for compatibility as if vested in federal judges. However, because
prescribed authorities need not be judges and Grollo is analogously applicable
to those that are, the provision governing prescribed authorities is certainly
workable.
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Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34B(2), (3).
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34B(4).
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F(3).
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.
Ibid.
Ibid 102-103 (Gaudron J); 114 (McHugh J).
In particular, section 71(iii) of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth
Parliament may vest State Courts with federal jurisdiction.
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116 (McHugh J).
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4.2

Detention Safeguards

Beyond the prudent exercise of judgment by issuing and prescribed authorities,
a series of safeguards against abuse of power are built into the detention and
questioning procedure. These concern the provision of independent legal
advice, translation services, minimum standards of treatment, complaints
procedures, recording of questioning and reporting on each detention, as set out
below. The Attorney-General’s Department has also produced a Protocol to
guide the section 34D warrant process.99 The Protocol specifies details
regarding the proscribed use of force, minimum facilities and accommodation
and proper manner of questioning and conditions.100
A person who is the subject of a warrant may contact a lawyer of his or her
choice.101 However, that right is limited, notably where the prescribed authority
is satisfied, on the basis of circumstances relating to that lawyer, that certain
communications may be made or destroyed as a consequence.102 Similarly, a
person may be questioned in the absence of the lawyer of his or her choice.
However, it is unclear what circumstances a prescribed authority may take into
account in determining whether questioning should proceed without a lawyer.
The Section 34D Protocol is silent on this issue.103 Further, client-lawyer
contact must be made in such a way as to be monitored by a person exercising
authority under the warrant, although the prescribed authority must provide the
lawyer reasonable opportunity during breaks in questioning to advise the
detainee.104 The lawyer may be removed for unduly disrupting questioning but
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The Section 34D Warrant Protocol was tabled before Parliament on 12 August 2003:
Attorney-General, Daryl Williams AM QC MP, ‘ASIO Protocol to Guide Warrant Process’
(Press Release, 12 August 2003) available from Attorney-General’s Website
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/attorneygeneralhome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2003_A
ugust_2003_ASIO_Protocol_to_guide_warrant_process_(12_August_2003)> at 5 August
2005. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C(3A)(a)(i)
requires the Inspector-General of Intelligence to be consulted in developing a written
statement of procedures to be followed in the exercise of ASIO’s detention powers under s
34D of the same Act. The Protocol is printed in the 2003-04 IGIS Annual Report, Annex
2: Annex 2 – Section 34D Warrant Protocol Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
<http://www.igis.gov.au/annuals/03-04/annex2.cfm> at 2 August 2005.
S34D Warrant Protocol, above n 99.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34C(3B),
34D(2)(b)(ii), (4).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34TA(2). Presumably,
‘circumstances’ concern whether the lawyer is known to be related or partisan. However,
‘circumstances’ might intend to refer to a lawyer’s security clearance: see Parliamentary
Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, above n 7, recommendation 6.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34TB(1). A note to s
34TB specifies that a prescribed authority must be present during questioning even if a
lawyer is not: see Section 34D Warrant Protocol, above n 99. This issue should be clarified
in the present review of Part III Division III or in the Protocol.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34U(2), (3).
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the detainee has the right to contact another lawyer if this occurs.105
Additionally, the lawyer is entitled to a copy of the warrant but not necessarily
any other document.106 It should be noted that the common law right to legal
representation107 applies to criminal procedures but not to intelligence
operations such as ASIO detention warrants. The latter is an administrative
proceeding, in relation to which representation is a legal requirement only in
limited circumstances.108
A prescribed authority must defer questioning if an interpreter is requested and
required by the detainee.109 The interpreter must be provided unless the
prescribed authority believes that the detainee has ‘adequate knowledge’ of
The ASIO
English or can communicate with ‘reasonable fluency.’110
Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (‘ASIO Amendment Act 2003’) extended the
total questioning period to 48 hours if an interpreter is present at any time
during a person’s interrogation.111 The rationale for the automatically extended
questioning period might be that at least double the time is required when
translation is used and that 48 hours provides a cap on the time extension.
Nevertheless, the necessity of automatically doubling time is questionable.112
The Crimes Act also provides for the use of interpreters during the questioning
of a suspect by police but not for the automatic doubling of interrogation
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Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34U(5), (6). It appears
that a lawyer can only interject to say that something is not clear, as acknowledged by the
Law Council of Australia: see Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of
Australia, Review of ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Powers: Discussion (2005),
available from the Australian Parliamentary Website
<http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb//view_document.aspx?TABLE=COMMJNT&ID=69
499> at 2 August 2005. Again, the Protocol does not address this issue: see Section 34D
Warrant Protocol, above n 99. By implication, any lawyerly question that falls outside this
narrow category can be seen as undue interruption. Whether lawyers can challenge the
prescribed authority regarding the ‘continuation of questioning’ is the subject of on-going
discussion between ASIO, the Inspector-General of Intelligence Services and the AttorneyGeneral’s Department: 2003-2004 IGIS Annual Report, above n 99, 129-130.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34U(2A).
Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292.
Krstic v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 20 FCR 486.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34HAA(3), (4),
34H(3), (4).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HAA(2).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HB(11).
It has even been suggested that this may breach the ICCPR, Article 26 of which provides
that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law
without discrimination, although this interpretation seems to over-extend Article 26. See
Cynthia Banham, ‘ASIO grillings will breach civil rights, warns expert’, Sydney Morning
Herald (Sydney), 27 November 2003 and corresponding comments in Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 68 2003-04, Australian Security and
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Bill 2003, Australian Parliamentary
Website <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd068.htm> at 29 November
2004.
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time.113 Rather, various times are to be disregarded in calculating the
investigation period.114 While obtaining an interpreter may be a time consuming
process, the 48-hour investigation period could be unnecessary. A potential
solution could be to adopt an approach similar to that under the Crimes Act,115
where, for example, any time taken to arrange for interpreters is added onto the
end of the investigation period.
It has also been asserted that the ASIO Terrorism Act may be unconstitutional
because it enables the executive arm of the Federal Government to detain people
without conviction for an offence, thus usurping a function of the judiciary.116
The constitutional basis for detention powers differs for aliens and Australian
citizens. The High Court of Australia has determined that, when detained
persons are aliens, the Executive’s power to detain is incidental to Parliament’s
legislative powers over aliens117 and, when exercised with bona fides for the
purposes of expulsion or deportation, is non-punitive in nature and does not
involve an exercise of the judicial power.118 In relation to citizens, the
constitutional legitimacy of using executive power to detain depends upon
whether detention is reasonably necessary to fulfill a non-punitive purpose.119
The categories of non-punitive purposes are not closed,120 although they are
approached with a strong legal presumption that legislation does not intend to
curtail fundamental freedoms such as personal liberty.121 To rebut the
presumption, there must be ‘a clear expression of an unmistakable and an
unambiguous intention to abrogate or curtail a fundamental freedom.’122 It
seems likely that the courts would find the unambiguous intention to detain as
articulated in the ASIO Terrorism Act is sufficient to rebut the presumption and
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Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 68 2003-04, Australian
Security and Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Bill 2003.
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 68 2003-04, Australian
Security and Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Bill 2003. See also Crimes
Act 1914 (Cth) s 23CB.
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23CB.
Williams above n 3, 215. This article was written before the 2003 amendments so many of
the provisions which Williams discusses have been modified. However, his argument that
the amendments are constitutionally suspect because they breach the separation of powers
doctrine would still be relevant to the ASIO Act in its present form.
Section 51(xix) of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth the power to legislate with
respect to aliens; see Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and
Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 30-32 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). The prerogative
power also provides a basis for the Government to adopt measures concerning ingress of
aliens: Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1329.
Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533, 556 (Latham CJ).
Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 162 (Gummow J).
Ibid.
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 197 ALR
241 (Black CJ, Sundberg and Weinberg JJ).
Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
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that the safeguards against abuse indicate a non-punitive purpose.123 Thus, the
argument that detention without conviction for questioning is inherently
unconstitutional is tenuous at best. It does not cause the detention powers to be
uncertain or unclear.
The ASIO Terrorism Act requires that a person detained or questioned must ‘be
treated with humanity and with respect for human dignity, and must not be
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by anyone exercising
authority under the warrant or implementing or enforcing the direction.’124 A
person’s appearance before a prescribed authority for questioning must be video
recorded.125 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security may be present
during questioning or when the person is taken into custody.126 Failure to treat a
detainee with humanity may result in up to two years imprisonment.127 Similar
penalties apply when police officers fail to bring the suspect before a prescribed
authority immediately after arrest,128 when an interview is conducted without an
interpreter in circumstances where an interpreter is appropriate129 or when the
provisions regarding strip searches are not followed.130 When a detainee first
appears before the prescribed authority, and then once every 24 hours thereafter,
he or she must be made aware of the right to seek a remedy in a judicial court
relating to the warrant or to the detainee's treatment in connection with the
warrant.131 The tough penalties for transgressors of these safeguards are likely
to deter their breach.

123

124

125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Attorney-General, Daryl Williams AM PC MP, ‘The war against terrorism, national
security and the Constitution: A response to Dr Renwick’ (Speech delivered at the annual
dinner of the NSW Bar Association Constitutional Law Section, Sydney, 3 October 2002),
available from Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Website at
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/Attorneygeneralhome.nsf/Page/RWP1ECEB58BC35FA5
67CA256B5F00755790?OpenDocument> at 14 February 2005.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34J(2). The words
‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ in this provision reflect those used in the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment [1989] ATS 21 (entered into force 26 June 1987). Jurisprudence established by
the Committee Against Torture under this Convention could assist the interpretation of
whether conduct amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Further, the Section
34D Protocol specifies that anyone who interacts with the person subject to a section 34D
warrant must do so in a humane and courteous manner, and must not speak to that person in
a demeaning manner. It provides that a ‘subject must not be questioned in a manner that is
unfair or oppressive in the circumstance’ and that a police officer must be present at all
times during questioning: above n 99.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34K(1)(a).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HAB.
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NB(4).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NB(2).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34NB(4).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34NB(5), (6).
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34E(1)(f), (3).
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Where the procedures for requesting a warrant have been contravened, a person
may complain to either the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security under
the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 or to the
Ombudsman under Part III of the Complaints (Australian Police) Act 1981.132
Questioning must be deferred if the Inspector-General is concerned about any
‘impropriety or illegality’ with regard to the questioning.133 At time of writing
(June 2005), the Inspector-General or a staff member has been present whenever
a person subject to a section 34D was questioned (other than for a short period
during one day of questioning, for which video-tape and a written transcript
were provided to the Inspector-General). Nevertheless, the manifest weakness
in this latter mechanism requiring deferral of questioning is that the InspectorGeneral is not required to be present or to be directly available to receive a
complaint.134
The ASIO Terrorism Act also imposes a number of reporting requirements as
additional safeguards. For example, the Director-General of ASIO must provide
written reports to the Minister on every terrorism warrant that is issued (under
section 34D), describing the extent to which action taken under the warrant
assisted ASIO to carry out its functions.135 In response to any concern of the
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security over impropriety or illegality, the
Director-General of ASIO must provide copies of any warrant and video
recording to the Inspector-General, as well as statements containing details of
any seizures or describing any action that the Director-General has taken.136
Where the Inspector-General receives a complaint from a person subject to a
section 34D warrant, the Inspector-General has the discretion to conduct a
formal inquiry into the complaint.137 In conducting such an inquiry, the
Inspector-General has the power to access ASIO’s documents.138 The
Inspector-General must present a report of the resulting conclusions and
recommendations to ASIO and the relevant minister, although ASIO is not
obliged to take action on those conclusions or recommendations.139 If the
Inspector-General is of the opinion that ASIO has taken inadequate or
inappropriate actions, the Inspector-General may prepare a report for the Prime
Minister.140
Of course, in common with all administrative measures to enhance the public
accountability of the executive, these safeguards against abuse of powers are
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administered by the executive itself and are vulnerable to manipulation. The
Inspector-General’s office has a small staff and one commentator has dismissed
it as a mere ‘veneer’.141 It is too easy to junk administrative mechanisms for
executive accountability, indeed the entire legal machinery for administrative
review, without empirical study of the substantial public benefits that they
provide. In fact, the safeguards against ASIO abuse of its security intelligence
gathering powers are extraordinary in their detailed ‘belt and braces’ selfreinforcement. Although fallible, they are significant.
4.3

Secrecy

The ASIO Amendment Act 2003 inserted secrecy provisions into the ASIO Act,
which principally address ASIO officers, detainees and their lawyers.142 A
person commits an offence by disclosing ‘operational information’ or
information related to a warrant.143 Operational information is defined as
information that ASIO has or has had, a source of information, or an operational
capability, method or plan belonging to ASIO.144 Information is warrant-related
if it indicates that a warrant has been issued, the content of a warrant or the
questioning or detention of a person in connection with a warrant.145
Operational information is obtained as a direct or indirect result of the issue of
the warrant or the doing of any act authorised under the warrant.146
It is now an offence to reveal operational information within two years after the
expiry of a warrant and, again, when the person disclosing it has obtained the
information as a direct or indirect result of the issue of the warrant or the doing
of any act authorised under the warrant.147 Both offences are strict liability
offences,148 which means that the onus falls upon suspects to demonstrate their
innocence. There are exceptions for permitted disclosures, which include
disclosures to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and to courts
for the purpose of commencing proceedings.149 There is also a safeguard that
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provides that the criminal provisions do not apply to the extent that they inhibit
any constitutionally implied freedom of political communication.150
It is questionable whether these secrecy provisions were necessary, given that
the Crimes Act 1914 already prohibits the disclosure of information by
Commonwealth officers without lawful excuse if such information was obtained
by virtue of their official positions.151 The Crimes Act also sets out offences for
disclosing official secrets and penalties ranging from six months’ to seven
years’ imprisonment.152 However, the effectiveness of the relevant Crimes Act
provisions, sections 70 and 79, is doubtful. The Independent Review
Committee on Commonwealth Criminal Law, chaired by Sir Harry Gibbs,
found that the secrecy provisions in the Crimes Act needed to be limited to
certain categories of information, such as information relating to intelligence
and security, defence and foreign relations, or confidential governmental
information.153 Subsequent reviews of the espionage and security procedures
have echoed this sentiment.154 They informed amendments to the espionage
provisions in the Criminal Code Amendment (Espionage and Related Offences)
Act 2002. Yet, despite the extensive new espionage provisions in the Criminal
Code, sections 70 and 79 in the Crimes Act remain. In light of the redundancy
of the Crimes Act provisions, the ASIO secrecy provisions appear necessary
because they specifically and clearly deal with containing intelligence leaks.
A further question concerns whether the secrecy provisions breach the freedom
of political communication implied in the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution. The test for compatibility with this freedom was established in
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, where it was held that legislation
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impinges on the implied freedom if it thwarts free communication about
government or political matters in ‘terms, operation or effect’ and the law is not
‘reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfillment of
which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed
system of representative and responsible government.’155 The ASIO secrecy
provisions clearly operate to stifle the flow of communication about
government. Keeping the public aware of ASIO activity may be important
information for the public concerning governmental political activity. Although
disclosures concerning operations and warrants are made illegal, there have
been occasions where journalists have reported suspects being detained under
ASIO’s anti-terrorism laws and it is unclear whether such disclosures were
‘permitted disclosures’ under the secrecy provisions.156 Although the ASIO
Terrorism Act contains a provision upholding the freedom of political
communication, only a High Court challenge will confirm its scope.157 Thus,
while the new ASIO provisions are generally necessary and clear, the precise
scope of the secrecy provisions for the purposes of academic comment and
journalism should be clarified.
Secrecy provisions (both the ASIO and the Crimes Act secrecy provisions) raise
broader contentious issues concerning government accountability. Due to the
sensitive nature of its operations, Australia’s domestic intelligence gathering
agency operates behind a cloak of secrecy. This might lead to the conclusion
that ASIO’s functions are inherently incompatible with notions of accountability
and the rule of law in any democratic society.158 Indeed, modern Western
liberal democracies are built around notions of accountability. Should their
intelligence services’ activities never be open to democratic scrutiny? It is
certainly arguable that, given the need for secrecy on the one hand and the need
for public accountability on the other, Parliament attempted to strike a balance
in the ASIO Terrorism Act. It set in place a system of administrative review
through the Inspector-General. In addition, it set in place a cycle of
parliamentary review and Executive actions are subject to judicial review.
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4.4

Parliamentary and Judicial Review

The formulation and implementation of the ASIO Terrorism Act is subject to
close parliamentary review, as evidenced by its passage through Parliament.
The Bill was introduced to Parliament on 21 March 2002 and then referred to
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, and to the Senate
Legal and Constitutional Legislation References Committee. The Joint
Committee released its report in May 2002.159 The Bill then passed the House
of Representatives with amendments on 24 September 2002 and was
reintroduced into the Senate on 15 October. It was referred to the Senate
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills on 16 October and then again to
the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee on 21 October
2002.160 The latter issued its report on 3 December,161 but the Bill was laid
aside on 13 December 2002 after the two Houses of Parliament could not agree
on proposed amendments. It passed both Houses with amendments and
received the Royal Assent on 22 July 2003. Subsequently, it has been amended
five times.162 A sunset clause provides that the ASIO Terrorism Act provisions
are to expire three years from the date of commencement.163 At the time of
writing, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD has
commenced its review of ASIO’s detention powers, pursuant to a provision
inserted into the Intelligence Services Act 2001 by the ASIO Amendment Act
2003.164 Whether the ASIO provisions and safeguards have struck the
appropriate balance, and whether the provisions are still necessary beyond 2006,
is something that the Joint Committee will consider in light of their initial period
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of operation. Far from subverting the democratic process, it seems that the
ASIO Act is properly exercising Australia’s democracy.
Whether the courts can effectively review ASIO activities is uncertain. It can be
argued that ASIO’s actions are, in principle, subject to judicial review. In
Church of Scientology v Woodward, ASIO’s powers to investigate potential
security threats were questioned by the Australian High Court, which was
divided on the matter.165 Murphy J held that any powers granted to ASIO must
be exercised bona fides, ‘for the purposes for which they are conferred and with
due regard to those affected.’166 Similarly, Mason J stated that ASIO is not
authorised to exceed its statutory functions in relation to security and that a
court can determine whether intelligence obtained by ASIO is relevant to
security.167 Although Brennan J agreed with the High Court’s position that
relief can be obtained if it can be shown that ASIO had acted ultra vires, he
stated that the plaintiff must overcome evidentiary difficulties in proving that a
particular matter is or is not relevant to security..168 In that connection, Gibbs CJ
held that ‘it is impossible for a court to say that any intelligence collected in
good faith … is not relevant to security, since it may, in the light of other
material, bear on the question whether a person is or is not a security risk’.169
Thus, ASIO as an agency is subject to judicial review, in principle.170 However,
in practical terms, supporting evidence is difficult to adduce or assess. The
judgment of Gibbs CJ indicates that the High Court might be reluctant to
second-guess the particular decisions that ASIO considers necessary to protect
national security. Judicial reluctance seems to be informed by the realization
that, in fact, the judiciary is not well equipped to evaluate the competing
interests that determine issues of national security.171 That reluctance might be
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confirmed in the current global security environment, where national security
officers must synthesize and analyse complex data trails to draw conclusions
concerning the intentions and resources of particular persons. For example, in a
decision concerning deportation of a person on grounds of terrorism
involvement, a majority of the British House of Lords considered that it could
evaluate national security information, but declined to do so.172 On the other
hand, in a more recent decision, a British specialist judicial body, the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission, overturned a decision of the Home
Secretary.173 The Home Secretary, who had assessed a detainee as a threat to
national security, then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the
appeal as no error on the part of the Commission could be demonstrated.174 The
case might indicate a more muscular British judicial approach to reviewing
security intelligence activities, one that could encourage Australian judiciary to
examine security intelligence as evidence.
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CONCLUSION

Were the ASIO Act counter-terrorism amendments unnecessary, in the sense of
being duplicative or overlapping substantially and inconsistently with existing
national laws? ASIO already had the power to gather intelligence by means such
as conducting searches and intercepting telephones prior to passage of the Act.
However, it did not have the power to detain and compulsorily question
individuals. Thus, the new detention powers are not duplicative of existing
provisions. The actual use of the new powers is constrained by prerequisite
approval of the Attorney-General and judicially or legally experienced ‘issuing
authorities’ and questioning is to be undertaken before similarly qualified
‘prescribed authorities’. These constraints seek to provide some assurance that
individual detentions will be warranted only when properly considered
necessary.
Are the amendments clear, in the sense of being specific, certain, readily
understood and practicable? There is cause for concern on these grounds. Some
of the safeguards against abuse of the new powers lack clarity. Most
importantly, the safeguard concerning the presence of the Inspector-General of
Intelligence and Security during detention procedures is not sufficiently
practicable on the face of it. Importantly, it lacks a specific mandatory
requirement for the Inspector-General to be present during questioning.
Concomitant with this is the failure to specify, in case of the absence of the
Inspector-General, a process for prompt and immediately effective delivery of
complaints to the Inspector-General.
Another safeguard requiring clarification concerns attendance of a detainee's
preferred legal adviser during questioning.
The legislation allows for
circumstances in which a detainee's preferred lawyer may be excluded but these
circumstances are not made explicit. Finally, the scope of ASIO’s new secrecy
provisions also needs clarification as they relate to journalism and academic
comment concerning warrant-related and operational information. (In general,
the Commonwealth’s outdated secrecy provisions need revision and
clarification, particularly those in the Crimes Act.)
Despite the above shortcomings, adequately articulated safeguards include the
required presence of independent 'prescribed authorities', the use of
interpretation and humane treatment and mandatory audio-visual recording and
the delivery of reports on each detention. Overall, these safeguards against
abuse are relatively extensive, detailed and clear.
The strategy of terrorism is to generate public fear. The Hilton bombing
imbroglio has ensured that the Australian public mistrusts security intelligence
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agencies.175 Nor should it trust agencies with opportunities to abuse their
power. Nevertheless, alarmist accusations that the Australian Government’s
proposed reforms create a police state are themselves exploitative of a culture of
public fear. There will always be debate as to whether security intelligence
powers are proportionate to threats. The use of a legalistic rights-based
framework to critique those powers cannot adequately assess proportionality.
That debate is, in essence, political rather than legal and cannot be determined
solely by legal arguments, even where human rights discourse is employed. The
ASIO Terrorism Bill in its original form was subject to countless political
critiques and to a robust process of democratic scrutiny that led to substantial
amendments. Extended parliamentary scrutiny and debate produced a precise
and clearly structured legal framework including calibrated safeguards that seek
to ensure that the new powers include civil liberties protections, are exercised
fairly and are subject to regular parliamentary review.
Ultimately, it is the role of Parliament to define the balance of interests on
which security intelligence legislation is based, the role of the Executive to craft
policies to implement that legislation, and the role of civil liberties communities
to challenge them both. All three have been hard at work during the process of
reform of Australian national security intelligence laws. It remains for the
federal courts to review their work by ruling on the constitutionality of the
Parliament’s laws and the legality of the Executive’s implementation of them.
No doubt, the application of ASIO’s new powers will be judicially tested for
ultra vires, based on lack of bona fides, or for unconstitutionality, based on
incompatibility with the implied freedom of political communication. In all
likelihood, we shall not need to wait long for the judiciary to be called into play.
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